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This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians’ outside earnings. In 
our framework, politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to 
an alternative use generating outside earnings. The main hypothesis is that the amount of 
time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition. We 
test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the German 
federal assembly. Taking into account the potential endogeneity of measures of political 
competition that depend on past election outcomes, we find that politicians facing low 
competition have substantially higher outside earnings. 
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The conﬂict of interests between voters as principals and elected politicians as agents is an
old theme. While voters are concerned with electing competent representatives, they cannot
directly observe eﬀort and ability. In general, this lack of monitoring and the resulting
asymmetric information allows elected politicians to extract rents or simply to shirk. Political
rents may take various forms, such as pork-barrel projects, corruption, or slack to cultivate
private aﬀairs. The most important mechanism that helps voters to keep elected oﬃcials
accountable for their actions (i.e. to reduce the extent of rent extraction and shirking) is
electoral competition. While there is a sizable theoretical literature on the eﬀects of diﬀerent
electoral rules on the level of rent extraction1 and a number of empirical studies using macro
data2, there are few empirical studies that provide micro-evidence on the relation between
forms and intensity of electoral competition and the behavior of politicians.
One potentially important dimension of diverging interests between elected representatives
and voters is the opportunity of politicians to engage in private sector activities to earn
outside income. Interestingly, in most democracies elected politicians such as members of
parliament can legally work in the private sector. It has been noted that the opportunity of
elected oﬃcials to keep private sector jobs and corresponding income may well have positive
eﬀects on the overall quality of policymaking. For instance, if high-ability citizens can keep
outside earnings while appointed in parliament, they will be more likely to run for public
oﬃce. Hence, outside earnings may increase the average quality of politicians (Gagliarducci
et al., 2007). In contrast, for given ability, if politicians devote part of their time to private
sector work, this will tend to reduce the quality of policymaking.3
This paper uses micro-data to investigate the role of electoral competition for the tradeoﬀ
between political activities and work that generates outside earnings. The general idea
behind this is straightforward: While voters usually cannot observe the amount of time
devoted to outside work, they can punish politicians for neglecting their responsibilities and
pursuing their private business by voting them out of oﬃce. Consequently, when deciding
on the optimal level of private sector activities, elected politicians will weigh the gains from
outside work against the increased risk of not getting reelected. If electoral competition is
low, the probability of reelection is high, and the marginal beneﬁt from political activity is
low. In contrast, if competition is ﬁerce and electoral races are close, the marginal beneﬁt
1See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) and Myerson (1993).
2Examples are Persson and Tabellini (2003), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) as well as Milesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002).
3We do not discuss the case where politicians are inﬂuenced by or even get ﬁnancially dependent on
special interest groups. For related evidence, see Couch et al. (1992), analyzing how politicians who are on
the payroll of higher education institutions aﬀect public funding per college student.
1of political work tends to be high. Consequently, electoral competition aﬀects the tradeoﬀ
between political activity and work in the private sector. If competition gets stronger,
politicians re-allocate time from outside work towards political activity, and outside earnings
decrease. In this perspective, electoral competition limits political rents.
As our main contribution to the literature, we test the hypothesis that politicians facing
strong political competition devote less time to outside work. Using a unique dataset cove-
ring all members of the German Bundestag and providing detailed information on outside
earnings for the years 2005-07, we test whether the degree of electoral competition has any
eﬀect on outside earnings. Our identiﬁcation strategy accounts for the fact that measures of
electoral competition are likely to be endogenous in an empirical model of outside earnings.
Exploiting the fact that, in German federal elections, voters cast one vote to elect a candidate
representing the electoral district and a second vote to determine the strength of parties in
the Bundestag, we construct instrumental variables for the degree of electoral competition
at the district level. Our results point to a signiﬁcant impact of electoral competition on
outside earnings. An increase in the vote margin in the preceding election by one standard
deviation is estimated to increase outside earnings over a four-year term by about 17,900
Euros on average.
The paper is related to a number of contributions dealing with electoral competition and
the behavior or decisions of elected oﬃcials. Parker (1992) oﬀers a general discussion of the
determinants of honoraria income among members of the U.S. Congress, ﬁnding no eﬀect
of electoral competition. Besley (2004) builds a principal-agent model in which the eﬀect
of higher wages on politicians’ activities can be analyzed. Gagliarducci et al. (2008) show
that Italian politicians who are elected by majority rule show higher eﬀort levels (lower
absenteeism) than politicians who are elected in a proportional system. The voting behavior
of members of the U.S. Senate is analyzed in Rosenson (2007). Among other things, the
author ﬁnds that electorally vulnerable members were less likely to vote for their own salaries
to increase. Finally, Gagliarducci et al. (2007) point to a positive relation between outside
income and absenteeism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline our main
hypothesis concerning the impact of electoral competition on politicians’ behavior. Section
3 describes the institutional background, the empirical model and the data including some
descriptive statistics. The results of our empirical analysis are presented in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
22 The main hypothesis
Our analysis is based upon the model of the politician as a rational utility-maximizing
agent. We assume that politicians receive utility from income (i.e. consumption) and from
being in oﬃce. We consider a politician’s allocation of time between outside occupations,
deﬁned as all activity generating earnings exceeding the regular income of legislators, and
political work, which is assumed to be all activity related to legislation and campaigning,
e.g. giving speeches, working in parliament committees, attending sessions, working in the
home constituency, etc. From the point of view of a politician, political work is valuable as
it increases the probability of reelection. Since politicians are regularly paid on a lump-sum
basis (exceptions are discussed below), income can only be increased by working in some
outside occupation. Thus, politicians face a tradeoﬀ between allocating time to outside
occupations (i.e. generating income) and political work (i.e. increasing the probability of
being reelected).
Based on the framework outlined above, it is straightforward to show that the utility-
maximizing politician will choose an allocation which equates the marginal beneﬁts of both
types of activity.4 Intuitively, the condition for an optimal allocation of time requires that
the marginal hour of political work yields the same utility gain as the last hour spent in
an outside occupation. Put diﬀerently, a rational choice implies that the (utility-weighed)
income increase due to an enhanced reelection probability equals the hourly wage rate in the
outside occupation.
In the following, we focus on how political competition aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between outside
work and political work. Concerning the operationalization and measurement of competition
we adopt the methodology used in the literature, see e.g. Parker (1992), which can be ex-
plained as follows. Assume that an incumbent competes with a challenger for a constituency
(see below for more information on the institutional background in Germany). Whereas in
some constituencies a large majority of voters prefers a candidate over the other, in others
the preferences of voters are rather equally distributed. In the former constituency, com-
petition is low because the candidates face low chances to aﬀect the outcome of elections
by increased political eﬀort. In the latter, competition is strong since it is more likely that
political work or performance will make the diﬀerence at the election day.
In the above setting, the degree of electoral competition has a straightforward eﬀect on
a politician’s optimal allocation of time. If competition is low, the marginal beneﬁt of
political work is low. Accordingly, the rational politician will spend more time in outside
4In a former version of this paper, we derive the hypothesis using a formal model, see Becker et al.
(2008).
3occupations. However, if competition is ﬁerce, the politician has the incentive to spend more
time for activities increasing the probability of being reelected.
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the amount of time politicians allocate to political and
outside work. In order to be able to test the above hypothesis, we must rely on the assump-
tion that, conditional on individual characteristics, the wage rate for outside work is equal
across politicians. In practical terms this means that, after taking account of a large number
of individual characteristics like gender, age, educational attainment, party aﬃliation etc.,
the observable variation on outside earnings is assumed to result from diﬀerences in terms of
time allocated to outside work rather than diﬀerences in politicians’ wage rates. Eﬀectively,
our main hypothesis therefore states that an increase in political competition will result in
a decrease in politicians’ outside earnings.5
A second measurement problem relates to political competition, i.e. current voter preferences
across candidates. As these preferences are unobservable, we use the diﬀerence between the
vote shares of individual candidates in the preceding election as a substitute. To the extent
that voter preferences are relatively stable over time, vote margins from past elections should
provide us with proxies for current political competition.
While we assume political work and outside income to be substitutes, one might think of
cases where political work is directly linked to income generation. For example, politicians
may serve their party’s or their voters’ interest as a (remunerated) board member of large
ﬁrms or as lawyers and advisors. Furthermore, they may be paid through various channels
by interest groups which try to attain certain special treatments6 or may be in the position
to decide on legal proposals which aﬀect their own income.7 We abstract from all linkages
between political work and outside income because of the lack of adequate data. However,
if outside occupations increase the MPs’ probability of being reelected, this will bias our
estimations downwards. Thus, if such direct positive linkages between political work and
income existed, our estimations would underestimate the negative eﬀect of competition on
outside earnings.
5Of course, diﬀerences in outside income may also be driven by unobservables. However, this does only
cause a problem if these unobservable characteristics aﬀect both outside earnings and political competition.
For a detailed discussion of the issue, we refer the reader to Section 3.3.
6This is what Barro (1973) calls “political income”. See also Denzau and Munger (1986) for a discussion
of interaction between legislators and interest groups.
7Ziobrowski (2002) and co-authors (2002, 2004) examine the holding of common stock and real estate
assets by members of the US Congress.
43 Empirical approach
The empirical analysis is tailored to test our main hypothesis. In particular, we want to
estimate how outside earnings of professional politicians react to varying degrees of electoral
competition. First, we brieﬂy describe the institutional background, with a focus on the
federal electoral system in Germany. We then brieﬂy present and describe the data. Finally,
we discuss our estimation approach, focussing on the potential endogeneity of our measure
of electoral competition and the suggested solution to this problem.
3.1 Institutional background
The Bundestag is the legislative branch of the German federal political system (together
with the Bundesrat, representing the state governments). The Bundestag is elected every
four years.8 Each citizen has two diﬀerent votes, a ﬁrst vote and a second vote. The ﬁrst
vote is directly attributed to a candidate representing the electoral district. In each electoral
district, the candidate obtaining the largest number of ﬁrst votes is elected to the Bundestag
by a direct mandate (even if the sum of all other candidate’s votes is larger). This part of
the election has features of the majority voting system. With the second vote the elector
votes for a party which may then, according to its share of party votes, send candidates
from predeﬁned electoral lists into the Bundestag, which has the feature of proportional
representation. These electoral lists contain party candidates in a predeﬁned order.9 While
each directly elected candidate represents one of the 299 electoral districts, candidates on
the party lists can only capture the remaining 299 seats of the Bundestag in accordance with
their party’s overall share of second votes. The position of candidates on the party lists is
subject to ballot votes taking place on party conventions. There is a minimum threshold of
either 5% of the national party vote or three direct mandates.10
3.2 Data
In the following, we discuss the data and present summary statistics. Since our empirical
analysis will be concerned only with the 299 directly elected members of Parliament (MPs,
8The Bundestag cannot be dissolved neither by the government nor by itself. However, the chancellor
may ask the President of Germany for new elections of the Bundestag after the Bundestag has rejected
her/him asking for a vote of conﬁdence.
9Some of the direct mandate candidates are on the electoral lists. Thus, in case they are not elected, it
depends on their position on the list whether they enter the Bundestag or not.
10In case that a party has less than 5% votes but three direct mandates, it obtains a number of seats in
accordance to its vote share (proportional representation).
5henceforth), we report summary statistics only for this subsample of all MPs. Recall that
we exclude MPs that have been elected through party lists to obtain a sample of politicians
with homogenous perceptions of electoral competition.
Our key variables are outside earnings and electoral competition. The information on outside
earnings is obtained from Bundestag (2007). In 2005, the Bundestag decided to publish an
annual report on outside earnings received by the MPs.11 From 2005 on, each MP must
report the number and earnings class of his or her outside occupations.12
The report on individual outside earnings classiﬁes each individual job into one of four
diﬀerent categories: regular occupation, position in a company in the private sector, position
in a company in the public sector and position in a non-proﬁt association. For each category,
we have the number of jobs and, for each job, the information if it is either one-time or at
regular intervals, and the amount of payments received according to four intervals [0;1,000),
[1,000;3,500), [3,500;7,000), [7,000,∞).13 Assuming an upper bound of 12,000 Euros for
the highest interval, we calculated the amount of outside earnings for each individual MP
by using average values for each income category, i.e. 500; 2,250; 5,250; 9,500.14
Table 1: Descriptives on key variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Outside earnings 10,501 25,254 0 144,500
Vote margin (ﬁrst votes, in %) 13.7 10.5 0.1 48.1
Note:
Only directly elected candidates included (N = 299).
Regarding electoral competition, the German electoral system suggests to use the ﬁrst-vote
margin, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the vote share that a given MP has received in his
electoral district and the vote share of the runner-up. The data refer to the 2005 election
and are obtained from Bundeswahlleiter (2008), which is also the data source for results
11Cf. Bundestag (2006).
12The information on outside earnings is available on the webpage of each MP at
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs e/members/mdb/index.html and it is updated in irregular intervals.
We collected this data in fall 2007 and updated the information in the beginning of 2008 to include all
outside earnings from 2005-07.
13The fact that all earnings above 7,000 Euro enter the same category - beside the legal threat to be
punished in case of misreporting - make us conﬁdent that the data are reliable. Furthermore, misreporting
has probably a high political cost. This became evident when Otto Schily, the former minister of home
aﬀairs, lost a lawsuit when he refused to publish his income as a lawyer.
14The highest category has no upper bound. Therefore, in order to obtain a measure of outside income in
the highest category, we have to make an assumption. We decided to choose a level of 12,000 Euros, giving
us a linearly increasing diﬀerence between the category medians. As this choice may induce distortions, we
experimented with several alternative upper bound levels. The results do not change qualitatively. In terms
of quantitative eﬀects, note that the chosen upper bound level is presumably a conservative guess. In Section
4, we also brieﬂy comment on changes in our ﬁndings if we calculate outside earnings using the lower bounds
of each income category, i.e. 0; 1,000; 3,500; 7,000.
6of previous elections and the second vote shares. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for
our key variables. The average directly elected candidate receives outside earnings of about
10,500 Euros per year. The standard deviation of more than 25,250 Euros indicates that
the variation across MPs is substantial. The average ﬁrst-vote margin is 13.7 percentage
points. Again, there is signiﬁcant variation across politicians.
Table 2: Descriptives on personal and political characteristics
Variable Frequency % outside earnings>0 Mean income
Sex
Male 229 0.86 12740
Female 70 0.80 3178
Age
median or below 155 0.84 10629
above median 144 0.85 10365
Education
High school or less 49 0.82 12576
University 196 0.85 9709
Ph.D. 54 0.87 11587
Family status
married with children 179 0.88 13222
other 120 0.79 6444
Region
West 234 0.82 12034
East 65 0.92 4987
Leading position
0 194 0.82 6073
1 105 0.90 18684
Service in committee
0 57 0.91 25424
1 242 0.83 6987
Party
Christian Democrats 149 0.89 13150
Other 150 0.80 7871
Terms served
1 43 0.79 12317
2 95 0.79 7015
3 61 0.92 8639
4 33 0.88 19808
5 67 0.88 11391
Notes:
Only directly elected candidates included (N = 299). The median age is 54. The family status ”other”
includes singles (n=53), single parents (n=25) and married without children (n=42). Among the other
party members, 145 are from the Social Democrats.
Regarding our control variables, we have collected information on personal characteristics
(education, family status, etc.) as well as political variables (party aﬃliation, number of
7terms served, etc.) from the MPs’ webpages. Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics.
For each variable, we display the number of MPs, the fraction of MP with strictly positive
outside earnings, and the mean income in all relevant categories which we use as controls in
the estimations.
A few details stand out. Firstly, male MPs have outside earnings that are more than four
times higher than female MPs. Secondly, MPs from West Germany have almost three times
higher outside earnings, although MPs from East Germany are more likely to have outside
jobs. Thirdly, the income of MPs with a leading position within the party or the parliament
(chairman or vice chairman of a political party or a parliament committee) is substantially
higher compared to the income of common members of the Bundestag. However, not serving
in a committee leads to almost three times higher outside earnings. Fourthly, Christian
Democrats have signiﬁcantly higher income than politicians from all other parties.
3.3 Estimation approach
We take a straightforward approach to test the empirical implications of our main hypothe-
sis. The dependent variable is the amount of annual outside earnings, the key explanatory
variable is the vote margin. Using a measure for electoral competition based on the outcomes
of the preceding election means that politicians are assumed to form expectations on the
degree of competition in coming elections based on outcomes of past electoral races.
The main diﬃculty when estimating the impact of electoral competition on outside earnings
is the fact that a MP’s ability to earn income from outside work is not only related to the
tradeoﬀ between additional income and deteriorating reelection prospects, but will also de-
pend on personal characteristics aﬀecting the productivity of outside work. We account for
this by including a vector of additional explanatory variables in our estimation equation. In
particular, we control for a number of personal characteristics that might aﬀect the produc-
tivity of MPs in generating outside earnings. However, there is no guarantee that including
observable characteristics on the right-hand side of an estimation equation relating outside
earnings to electoral competition will suﬃce to provide us with reliable point estimates. The
reason for this is that there might be unobservable characteristics that aﬀect the ability
to earn market income and, at the same time, correlate with electoral success. To give a
straightforward example, some MPs may simply be smarter than others, making them more
successful in terms of election outcomes and in terms of generating outside earnings. Since
the error term in our estimation equation will account for all unexplained variation in out-
side earnings, the fact that smartness is (at least to some extent) unobservable will induce
correlation between the residual and electoral competition as our key explanatory variable.
8This correlation will render OLS coeﬃcient estimates inconsistent. As described below, we
use instrumental variables (IVs) to overcome the potential endogeneity problem.
Based on the discussion of the tradeoﬀ between allocating time to political work and outside
occupations, we consider the following linear equation that relates reported outside earnings
of MPs to the degree of electoral competition and controls
yi = α + βci + Xiδ + ǫi, (1)
where yi denotes outside earnings, ci is electoral competition, Xi is a vector of control
variables, and ǫi is the error term. To obtain a reasonable measure for ci, we restrict our
attention to those MPs who directly represent an electoral district, i.e. who obtained a
majority of ﬁrst votes within their electoral district. This provides us with a sample of
299 MPs who are homogenous in the sense that their perceptions regarding the probability
of reelection in coming elections can reasonably be assumed to depend on the district-level
degree of competition in the preceding election. As mentioned above, we use the vote margin
as a measure for the district-level degree of electoral competition.
Regarding the vector of control variables, Xi, we use the data on MPs’ personal characte-
ristics described in the previous subsection. In addition, we account for political variables
like the number of terms served, party aﬃliation, and service in committees. Furthermore,
we include a dummy for East Germany to allow for common regional shocks that might
aﬀect the ability to raise income from outside work and to account for a potential impact
of regional traditions and beliefs regarding the tradeoﬀ between political eﬀort and outside
work.
As discussed above, we suspect that unobserved factors driving both outside earnings and
our measure of electoral competition induce correlation between the residual, ǫi, and ci. To
deal with this problem, we employ an instrumental variable, zi, and estimate the coeﬃcients
in equation (1) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). To be a valid instrument, a variable
must satisfy two conditions: it must be strongly (partially) correlated with ci once the
exogenous explanatory variables are netted out, and it must be exogenous in the structural
equation, i.e. zi must be uncorrelated with ǫi. A valid instrument which is suﬃciently
strongly correlated with the vote margin will provide us with exogenous variation that can
be exploited to overcome the endogeneity problem and to identify the eﬀect of interest.
Our choice of zi rests on the institutional characteristics of the federal electoral system in
Germany. In particular, we exploit the fact that voters vote on district-level candidates
(ﬁrst vote) and parties (second vote) at the same time. Recall that candidates who are
directly elected by obtaining a majority of (district-level) ﬁrst votes become members of the
9Bundestag irrespective of their party’s overall second-vote share. We exploit this feature
and deﬁne our instrumental variable, zi, to be the share of second votes MP i’s party has
obtained within i’s electoral district in the preceding election. zi lends itself as an instrument
for ci because both the share of ﬁrst votes of a given candidate and the share of second votes
of the candidate’s party will be correlated due to voters casting both of their votes according
to party preferences. Moreover, as long as the second vote reﬂects only party preferences,
zi will not be correlated with the residual. The ﬁrst-stage regression in our instrumental
variable estimations thus reads
ci = γ + Xi  + θzi + ui. (2)
Intuitively, the IV estimations will use the ﬁtted values from this regression as substitutes for
ci in the OLS regression of outside earnings on MPs’ characteristics. Hence, the identiﬁcation
of the impact of electoral competition on outside earnings will rely only on that part of the
variation in ci which is driven by exogenous variables.
However, one might think of unobserved factors aﬀecting outside earnings, ﬁrst-vote margins
as well as the second vote shares. In this case, zi may not be a valid instrument. To recall
the example, one could think of unobserved candidate characteristics which drive up outside
earnings and the ﬁrst-vote share. If, at the same time, the second-vote share of the respective
party depends on the popularity of the candidate (voters may tend to vote for the party
whose candidate they like most), an instrument which is based on second-vote shares may
be endogenous to outside earnings. To cope with this problem, we extend the analysis by
using an IV which has been derived from election results prior to 2005. For details, we refer
the reader to Section 4.
4 Empirical results
We start the discussion of our empirical results with a set of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is reported outside earnings of
directly elected members of the Bundestag. Speciﬁcation (1) is a baseline speciﬁcation that
accounts for a number of individual characteristics like age, gender, educational attainment
etc. which are known to be important wage determinants in the labor economics literature.
The results indicate that an increase in the ﬁrst-vote margin by one percentage point triggers
an increase in outside earnings of about 307 Euros. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that female MPs
receive substantially lower income from outside work compared to their male colleagues,
that MPs whose family status is ‘married with children’ have higher and those from East
10Germany have lower outside income.
The second column reports an estimation where we have added the dummy for MPs with
leading positions. This variable might be positively correlated with the vote margin, biasing
the vote margin coeﬃcient upwards. However, although the additional explanatory variable
is highly signiﬁcant (with the coeﬃcient carrying the expected positive sign) and more than
doubles the adjusted R2, the ﬁndings regarding the impact of the vote margin are almost
unchanged. Among the controls, the dummy for MPs from East Germany is now not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero. We proceed by adding the count of committee memberships
as a further right-hand side variable. Since serving in committees is time consuming, we
expect this variable to reduce outside earnings and, if omitted from the regression, to induce
a downward bias in the vote margin eﬀect. Again, however, the inclusion of the additional
control seems to have little impact on our ﬁndings. Column (4) adds a dummy for Christian
Democrats. Since voting patterns could diﬀer across regions depending on the dominant
party, the dummy could also be correlated with the vote margin. The results do not provide
evidence for this, though, with the coeﬃcient of the vote margin almost identical to the
previous speciﬁcations.
Finally, Column (5) reports a regression where we have added the number of terms served.
We expect this variable to negatively aﬀect outside earnings (because an MP’s link to the
relevant job market environment becomes weaker the longer he is out of his original oc-
cupation). Since more senior MPs should also beneﬁt more from the common incumbent
advantage and, therefore, face higher vote margins, omitting the number of terms served is
expected to bias the coeﬃcient of the vote margin downwards. The evidence supports this
notion, with the key eﬀect of interest now being estimated to be signiﬁcantly larger. Note
also that the estimate is now signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
To summarize the ﬁndings obtained so far, we note that the OLS estimates of the eﬀect
of the vote margin on the level of outside earnings varies in a predictable way with the
chosen speciﬁcation. This extends also to the inclusion of additional control variables like,
for instance, a full series of dummy variables for the MPs’ original occupations and a full
series of state dummies instead of the dummy for East Germany. Even if we include all these
additional regressors to the speciﬁcation in Column (5),15 we still ﬁnd that the vote margin
has a substantial positive impact on outside earnings. We also checked whether redistricting
between the 1998 and 2002 elections has any eﬀect on outside earnings (one could think of
MPs having to do more political work in order to support their popularity after a (partly)
15We do not report these results here because, due to the limited number of degrees of freedom, we cannot
include the additional regressors in the IV estimations reported below. In order to facilitate comparison
of estimation outcomes across speciﬁcations, we decided to report estimations with a limited number of
regressors for the OLS estimations, too.
11Table 3: Impact of electoral competition on outside earnings (OLS)
Dependent variable: Outside earnings of directly elected Members of Parliament
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vote margin 307.4⋆ 310.3⋆ 314.2⋆ 308.3⋆ 352.6⋆⋆
(174.6) (165.5) (164.6) (165.4) (168.0)
Female -6701⋆⋆⋆ -7287⋆⋆⋆ -7379⋆⋆⋆ -7273⋆⋆⋆ -7051⋆⋆⋆
(2100) (2178) (2167) (2280) (2247)
Age -8.11 -51.7 -71.9 -67.2 104.8
(162) (160.4) (158.2) (159.5) (192.5)
University -1208 -3334 -4404 -4382 -4220
(3991) (3884) (3844) (3842) (3847)
Ph.D. -1279 -3512 -4208 -4213 -3916
(4897) (5024) (5092) (5094) (5110)
Married with children 5155⋆ 5047⋆ 4839⋆ 4699⋆ 4646⋆
(2634) (2601) (2588) (2606) (2600)
East Germany -5023⋆⋆ -3410 -2042 -1888 -1329
(2349) (2297) (2226) (2251) (2225)
Leading position - 12728⋆⋆⋆ 10989⋆⋆⋆ 10948⋆⋆⋆ 12607⋆⋆⋆
(3580) (3386) (3426) (3669)
Serves in committee - - -5599⋆⋆ -5618⋆⋆ -6311⋆⋆⋆
(2343) (2338) (2408)
Christian Democrat - - - 771.7 1387
(2845) (2723)
Number of terms served - - - - -2362⋆
(1269)
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.096 0.115 0.113 0.120
Sample size 299 299 299 299 299
Notes:
Sample includes only directly elected MPs. Dependent variable is average annual outside earnings reported
for the years 2005-2007, measured in Euro. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: ⋆ 10%; ⋆⋆ 5%; ⋆⋆⋆ 1%.
change in their constituency). However, a dummy for the 175 electoral districts aﬀected by
redistricting between 1998 and 2002 proves to be far from being signiﬁcant, leaving us with
an estimate for the vote margin eﬀect on outside earnings of 366.7 (168.9), which is almost
identical to the result reported in Column (5).16
So far we have ignored the main identiﬁcation problem, i.e. the potential endogeneity of
the ﬁrst-vote margin as our measure for electoral competition. Table 4 reports results for
instrumental variables estimations that account for this problem.
We show three speciﬁcations that diﬀer in terms of the sample used for estimation and the
instrument employed in the ﬁrst stage regression. Column (1) depicts the results for a 2SLS
estimation using the full sample of 299 directly elected MPs, where we have instrumented the
16Moreover, we experimented with the number of outside jobs as dependent variable rather than the level
of outside earnings. We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the vote margin, though. A possible explanation
for this is the potentially large degree of heterogeneity across jobs which makes aggregation diﬃcult.
12ﬁrst-vote margin with the share of second votes of a politician’s own party, z2005, obtained
from the 2005 election. With a single IV, the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst-vote margin is exactly
identiﬁed, and we cannot test for instrument validity. Note, however, that z2005 is strongly
partially correlated with our measure for electoral competition, with a coeﬃcient of 1.50 and
a standard error of 0.05 in the ﬁrst stage regression. Moreover, the corresponding F-statistic
of the ﬁrst stage regression is about 792, suggesting that z2005 is a strong instrument for
the ﬁrst-vote margin. Turning to our key variable of interest, we note that the coeﬃcient of
electoral competition is about 424, signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding value in the
baseline OLS estimation (Column (5) in Table 3). Calculated over a four-year term, we ﬁnd
that a one-standard deviation increase in the ﬁrst-vote margin triggers a remarkable increase
in outside earnings of about 17,900 Euros. Note also that the point estimate is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
As mentioned above, one may question the validity of our instrument by arguing that second-
vote shares are (partly) driven by preferences over candidates in the respective electoral
district. This may induce correlation between the instrument and the residual in the main
estimation equation, leaving us with an invalid instrument. Our strategy to cope with this
problem is to use election results from the 1990 elections to construct the instrumental
variable z1990 (again deﬁned as the second-vote share of the respective MP’s party), and to
re-estimate the model using only MPs which did not run in the 1990 election. In general,
the unobserved factors driving the potential correlation between the instruments and the
residual in the estimation equation should become less prevalent the more distant elections
are used to generate the IVs, suggesting the ﬁrst federal elections after re-uniﬁcation as the
most distant that can reasonable be used for our purpose. Furthermore, when using a sample
that contains only MPs who did not run in the 1990 election, it is no longer possible for
unobserved, candidate-speciﬁc eﬀects to spoil our identiﬁcation. This is because the sample
of MPs who actually contribute to the regression in terms of observations on outside earnings
and ﬁrst-vote margins has nothing in common with the political personnel at the time of the
elections we exploit for constructing our instrumental variable.
Due to redistricting between 1998 and 2002 and the exclusion of the more senior MPs running
in 1990, the eﬀective sample size is reduced to 90 observations. To disentangle the eﬀect
of the change in the composition of the sample and the change in the IV, we report an
estimation using the reduced sample and z2005 as the instrument for the vote margin in
Column (2), and an estimation with the same sample, but z1990 as IV in Column (3).
Before turning to the estimation results, it is useful to have a look at Table 5, displaying
the means for the key variables in the diﬀerent samples. We conduct a two-group mean-
comparison t-test between the two subsamples and note that MPs who did not run in 1990
13Table 4: Impact of electoral competition on outside earnings (2SLS)
Dependent variable: Outside earnings of directly elected Members of Parliament
(1) (2) (3)
Vote margin 424.1⋆⋆ 617.9⋆⋆ 594.9⋆⋆
(178.0) (299.6) (302.2)
Female -6814⋆⋆⋆ -4677 -4724
(2142) (4162) (4199)
Age 109.1 -122.2 -125.3
(188.2) (213.4) (211.8)
University -4028 -730.0 -806.8
(3745) (5720) (5731)
Ph.D. -3694 1964 1881
(4943) (7807) (7785)
Married with children 4559⋆ 14994⋆⋆⋆ 14989⋆⋆⋆
(2579) (4660) (4661)
East Germany -978.2 3015 2838
(2175) (4062) (3802)
Leading position 12701⋆⋆⋆ 15577⋆⋆ 15484⋆⋆
(3610) (6316) (6254)
Serves in committee -6349⋆⋆⋆ 4015 4038
(2358) (4015) (4062)
Christian Democrat 1177 3061 3153
(2741) (4163) (4303)
Number of terms served -2473⋆ 2660 2705
(1272) (2587) (2621)
Sample size 299 90 90
IV: Second-vote share own party (year) 2005 2005 1990
Coeﬃcients of IV (1st stage) 1.50 1.58 1.20
(0.053) (0.069) (0.161)
F-Statistic for signiﬁcance of IV 791.6 516.8 55.6
Notes:
Sample includes only directly elected MPs. Dependent variable is average annual outside earnings reported
for the years 2005-2007, measured in Euro. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) in parentheses.
Sample in Columns (2) and (3) include only MPs who did not run in the 1990 election. Signiﬁcance levels:
⋆ 10%; ⋆⋆ 5%; ⋆⋆⋆ 1%.
have somewhat higher outside earnings and vote margins, are younger by 4.5 years, less
likely to hold either a University degree or a Ph.D., to be married with children, to be from
East Germany, and more likely to be Christian Democrats. Overall, however, the average
characteristics of the two groups seem to be pretty similar. Note in particular that the
diﬀerences in means for the key variables are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Applying the 2SLS procedure to the subsample of MPs who did not run in 1990 and using
z2005 as the IV, we obtain a signiﬁcantly higher point estimate for the impact of the vote
margin on outside earnings: with a coeﬃcient of 618, an increase in the vote margin by
one standard deviation increases outside earnings over a four-year term by about 26,000
Euros. Comparing this to the estimate from Column (3), where we have used z1990 instead
14Table 5: Comparison of means
Full sample MPs 1990 MPs not 1990 t-test
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outside earnings 10501 10090 11456 -0.428
Vote margin 13.7 13.4 14.3 -0.743
Female 0.234 0.234 0.233 0.021
Age 52.8 54.2 49.7 3.869⋆⋆⋆
University 0.655 0.689 0.577 1.861⋆
Ph.D. 0.180 0.172 0.200 -0.571
Married with children 0.598 0.636 0.511 2.034⋆⋆
East Germany 0.217 0.267 0.100 3.276⋆⋆⋆
Leading position 0.351 0.339 0.377 -0.631
Serves in committee 0.809 0.804 0.822 -0.370
Christian Democrat 0.498 0.440 0.633 -3.103⋆⋆⋆
Number of terms served 2.95 3.15 2.47 4.007⋆⋆⋆
Sample size 299 209 90
Notes:
Samples include only directly elected MPs. The t-test refers to the two-group mean-comparison test between
the MPs who did not run in 1990 (3) and those who did (2). Signiﬁcance levels: ⋆ 10%; ⋆⋆ 5%; ⋆⋆⋆ 1%.
of z2005 in the ﬁrst-stage regression, we ﬁnd that the choice of the instrument does not seem
to have any sweeping eﬀect on our results. Since the increase in the parameter estimate for
the vote margin occurs between Columns (1) and (2), we conclude that it is driven by the
switch from the full sample to the subsample, and not by a potentially ﬂawed identiﬁcation.
Hence, we interpret the ﬁndings from the instrumental variables estimations as supporting
our previous ﬁnding of a substantial impact of the vote margin on outside earnings. With
evidence suggesting that z2005 is a reasonable instrumental variable for the vote margin, we
suggest the results in Column (1) to be the most reliable estimates for the eﬀect of interest
in this study. We also note that the eﬀect of the vote margin in the subsample of less senior
MPs is much stronger than the average eﬀect across all MPs. For those who did not run in
the 1990 election, we ﬁnd a one-standard deviation increase in the ﬁrst-vote margin to be
associated with an increase in outside earnings by 25,100 Euros.
Regarding the robustness of our results to changes in the measurement of electoral competi-
tion, we also experimented with various measures describing the degree of eﬀective electoral
competition for MPs who are elected through party lists. However, we found it diﬃcult to
obtain robust results. This may have to do with the problem that, while we only observe
a given MP’s position on the relevant list in past elections, the behavior regarding outside
work should depend on politicians’ expectations on their position in coming election. We
also re-estimated the speciﬁcations discussed above (using the ﬁrst-vote margin as the mea-
sure for electoral competition) using the sample of MPs who ran as direct candidates but
eventually obtained a seat through a party list. In accordance with our expectations, we
15did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant relationship between outside earnings and ﬁrst-vote
margins.
Finally, we would like to stress that all our results are robust to computing individual
outside earnings using the lower bounds of the income categories instead of means.17 While
this provides us with a lower-bound estimate for the actual level of outside earnings, using
the speciﬁcation from Table 4, Column 1, we still obtain a coeﬃcient of 307, signiﬁcant at
the 5% level.
5 Conclusion
Due to asymmetric information between voters and elected representatives, the quality of
policy-making crucially depends on the incentives of elected politicians to align their actions
with the interests of voters as their principals. Among the various forms of interaction
between voters and elected oﬃcials, elections are certainly the most important incentive-
setting mechanism. However, there is surprisingly little micro-evidence on how politicians
react to varying degrees of electoral competition.
This paper adds to the literature in providing evidence on the link between electoral competi-
tion and politicians’ outside income. Exploiting the remarkable variation in reported outside
earnings in a new data set covering the members of the German Bundestag, we have asked
how outside earnings of MPs who represent electoral districts and are elected by majority
rule react to electoral competition. In accordance with predictions focusing on the tradeoﬀ
between outside work and reelection prospects, our results point to a signiﬁcant negative
impact of competition on private sector activities of MPs. We ﬁnd that a ten-percentage-
point decrease in the vote margin decreases annual outside income over a four-year term by
about 17,000 Euros on average. To account for the likely endogeneity of our measure for
electoral competition, we have employed instrumental variables that are motivated by the
speciﬁc institutional details of the German electoral system.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide micro-evidence on the eﬀec-
tiveness of competitive pressure in driving down politicians’ outside income. Parker (1992)
checks for the impact of electoral competition on honoraria income of Congress members
in the year 1989, but does not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect. This ﬁnding does not necessarily
need to contradict our results, because - besides from the diﬀerences in terms of time periods
and countries under consideration - honoraria are just a limited, strongly regulated18 and
17Recall that we assumed an upper bound of 12,000 Euros for the highest category.
18In 1989, US election laws limited each honorarium to $2,000. Representatives are allowed to keep an
16speciﬁc share in Congress members’ total income, whereas we consider all kinds of outside
income. Furthermore, our ﬁndings are complementary to the evidence in Gagliarducci et al.
(2008) on a positive relation between electoral competition and political eﬀort in terms of
session attendance. Thus, in the light of evidence presented in related studies, our ﬁndings
conﬁrm the picture of rational politicians trading the beneﬁts from increased outside ear-
nings against the higher risk of being elected out of oﬃce. When political competition gets
stronger, the tradeoﬀ between outside income and reelection prospects forces politicians to
invest more in political activities and, at the same time, to reduce activities that generate
outside earnings.
Though it is tempting to draw the conclusion that an increase in electoral competition
would beneﬁt voters, we would like to point to three caveats: Firstly, we have ignored the
impact of electoral competition on the self-selection of citizens into political careers.19 On
the one hand, it may well be the fact that increased competition reduces the average ability
of elected politicians. On the other hand, high outside income opportunities may attract
candidates who are not primarily interested in political work (adverse selection). We do
not have adequate data, though, to analyze this kind of question. Similarly, MPs with high
outside earnings may be strategically assigned to constituencies where their party has strong
support.20 We are conﬁdent, though, that this does not play an important role in our case,
as direct candidates are elected by local party members in each constituency who usually
feel strongly attached to their home constituency and less committed to macro strategies of
their federal party administration.
Secondly, we do not know if MPs will re-run for oﬃce in the next election (fall 2009) as this
information will only become available shortly before the election date. Therefore, we are
not able to control for the possibility that last-period opportunism on the part of exiting
MPs may underlie or even exaggerate the outside income earning activity.
Thirdly, while our data suggest that politicians devote less time to private sector activi-
ties, we do not directly observe whether politicians increase socially productive or socially
unproductive political work in response to increased competition (for instance, think of par-
liamentary work vs. campaigning). Depending on what type of activity beneﬁts most from
the reduction in private sector work, the impact on the welfare of voters may be quite dif-
amount of honoraria of 30 percent of their salary, senators are allowed to keep 40 percent.
19If competition drives down outside income, the decision to become politician may be aﬀected. E.g.,
Fiorina (1994) ﬁnds that higher compensation increases the number of Democrats in legislation. Part of the
analysis in Besley (2004) is concerned with the decision of high-ability-citizens to candidate for oﬃce, see
also Besley (2005) as well as Poutvaara and Takalo (2007). Further contributions in this ﬁeld are Messner
and Polborn (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Diermeier et al. (2005) as well as Mattozzi and Merlo (2007a,
2007b).
20Note that our IV estimation based on MPs who did not run in 1990 does not rule out this possibility.
17ferent. Hence, there remains plenty of scope for future research on the role of incentives in
the political sphere.
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